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VICTIMIZATION AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL:
A RESPONSE TO IVAN KARAMAZOV
Thomas F. Tracy

Ivan Karamazov raises a powerful moral objection to defenses of God's
goodness that sanction the sacrifice of the innocent to secure a general good.
This anti-consequentialist critique has considerable force against some of the
most familiar responses to the problem of evil, notably Plantinga's free will
defense. In this paper I examine Ivan's objection and consider several lines
of argument in reply. I contend that there are conditions under which it is
morally permissible, even on deontological grounds, for God to create a
world in which persons sometimes suffer as victims of natural or moral evils.

Imagine that it is you yourself who are erecting the edifice of human destiny
with the aim of making men happy in the end, of giving them peace and
contentment at last, but that to do that it is absolutely necessary, and
indeed quite inevitable, to torture to death only one tiny creature ... ,
would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?l

1. Ivan s Objection: The Sacrifice of the Innocent
In a famous chapter from The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan's voices a powerful moral objection to defenses of God's goodness that appeal strictly to
the overall balance of good and evil in the world. Ivan's bitter speech to
Alyosha recounts a series of arresting and vivid stories about the suffering
of children at the hands of malicious adults, and within this context he presses
his distinctive challenge to his brother's Christianity: can any morally sensitive person, any lover of humanity, embrace the view that these sufferings
are to be accepted as part of the price paid for some good end? Ivan's speech
is calculated to evoke in Alyosha and in us the moral intuition that no end is
worth having at this price, not even an "eternal harmony." More precisely,
though the good eventually attained may outweigh in value all the evils
suffered in attaining it, the wrong done to these innocents remains a morally
decisive indictment of the entire process.
In considering this challenge, it is important to note at the outset two
ambiguities in Ivan's passionate statement of the problem. First, it is not clear
whether Ivan thinks that the suffering and death of the innocent is a) a means
to the achievement of the eternal harmony, or b) something that must necessarily be permitted if the eternal harmony is to be realized. The differences
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between these alternatives should not be obscured, since free will defenses
trade upon this distinction. In either case, however, Ivan will press his objection; indeed, his rebellion seems to be motivated in part by the thought that
these children are victims not only of their human tormentors, but also of the
god who turns those tormentors loose to vent their vicious wills upon such
easy prey. Second, it is not clear whether Ivan imagines that the children he
describes will themselves participate in the eternal harmony made possible
in part by their suffering. He suggests at one point that a child who was
mauled to death by dogs, the child's mother, and the general who vengefully
set his hunting dogs upon the child might embrace in a universal reconciliation of each person with every other and all with God's justice. 2 In this case,
the sufferer shares in the good for the sake of which such suffering was
permitted (and this good is constituted in part in response to this evil). Even
under these circumstances Ivan would repudiate this higher harmony on the
grounds that it is purchased at a morally unacceptable price in innocent suffering. But, as we will see, the moral logic of this situation differs significantly
from one in which innocent lives are simply expended along the way to a good
that is enjoyed by others.
Ivan's moral challenge to defenders of God's goodness takes precisely the
form of one standard objection to utilitarianism. If we determine the morally
right course of action by calculating which of the options before us will
generate the greatest good for the greatest number, it looks as though we will
justify actions that harm individuals or groups in order to secure broadly
distributed benefits for others, and this (the objector contends) is a morally
unacceptable result. I will return below to questions about the moral assessment of actions that sacrifice the interests of some for the good of many.
I want first to note just how powerfully Ivan's objection can be deployed
against familiar defenses of God's goodness that appeal to human freedom.

2. The Free Will Defense
We can take as our model Alvin Plantinga's elegantly developed version
of the free will defense. 3 The task of Plantinga's defense is to respond to the
problem of evil in its logical form, i.e., to the claim that the propositions
(1) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good

and
(2) There is evil in the world

cannot both be true. In order to show that these propositions are logically
consistent, one must formulate some proposition R stating a reason for God's
permission of evil, and R must a) be logically possible, b) be consistent with
(1), and c) entail (2) either by itself or jointly with (1). The first of these
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conditions makes clear the limited goals of a defense; the defender does not
claim that R is God's reason for permitting evil, but only that it could be. The
second condition also significantly limits the commitments of a defense. R
must be consistent with God's perfect goodness, i.e., there must be a possible
world in which R is true and God is perfectly good. But this requirement can
be met even if R does not state morally sufficient conditions for creating a
world that contains evil; it may be that certain additional conditions must be
satisfied, beyond those explicitly stated in R. As Plantinga has pointed out,
a free will defense need not spell out these conditions. 4 The defense will
succeed, however, only if it is clear that there is at least one world W such
that a) a perfectly good being would be morally justified in creating Wand
b) W satisfies R. This may not, in fact, be clear. Indeed, if the defense is to
relevant to the actual world, then a case must be made not only that R is
possibly true, but also that ours is a world that God could be morally justified
in creating. And this is precisely what Ivan contests.
Abstracted from the machinery of his argument, Planting a 's proposal for R
can be stated in the following way.
R: 1) the existence of morally free creatures who perform morally good
actions is an intrinsic good, and
2) God actualizes a world such that:
a) W contains morally free creatures who freely do moral evil;
b) There is a net balance of moral good over moral evil in W;
c) It is not within God's power to actualize a world that contains as
much moral good and less moral evil than that found in W;
d) All the evils in Ware moral evils brought about by the free choices
of creaturely moral agents.

The first clause in R identifies the good for the sake of which evil is permitted;
namely, that there be creatures with incompatibilist freedom who perform
morally good actions.s The second clause then specifies a set of logically
possible conditions under which God might, for the sake of this good, create
a world containing evil. The third sub-condition, (c), reflects Plantinga's
response to the objection (from Mackie and others) that God ought to actualize a world in which free creatures never choose to do moral evil or, at
least, in which the balance of moral good and evil is more favorable.
Planting a argues that although there are possible worlds with a better balance
of moral good over moral evil than that found in W, it is possible that an
omniscient and omnipotent being cannot create any of them. 6 The fourth
condition addresses the problem of natural evil. Plantinga suggests that it is
enough, for the purposes of a defense, to say that natural evils result from the
malicious actions of non-human free creatures-we can attribute it all to the
nefarious activity of Satan, Beelzebub, Moloch, Mammon, and associates.?
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Plantinga devotes most of his attention to showing that (c) is compatible
with God's omniscience and omnipotence, and he says notably little about
the consistency of R with God's goodness. Having initially argued for the
consistency of (1) with the existence of some evil, Planting a goes on, in
constructing condition (c), to extend his argument to accommodate the
amount of evil (whatever it may be) found in the actual world. But this
strategy of argument cannot provide an answer to Ivan's objection. For Ivan
would insist that there are morally relevant features of the world God creates
other than the total amount of moral good and evil within it. A world might
achieve this overall good in a way that is morally problematic. If the good
can be won only by permitting the sacrifice of the innocent against their wills,
then Ivan will insist that this good ought not to be pursued.
The force of this objection is heightened by the limited range of goods that
Plantinga invokes in the first clause of R. Plantinga refers only to the immanent goods of moral life. But when the wrong choices of adults bring misery
and death to children, it certainly appears that these children do not share to
any significant degree in the good for the sake of which they are permitted
to suffer. Rather, they become the victims of other persons' moral freedom
before they have the opportunity to enter very fully into moral life themselves, and so their interests are sacrificed for a good that is achieved by and
for others.
This objection arises even more pointedly for Plantinga's appeal to angelic
free choices in accounting for natuJ:.al evils. Suppose we grant that a world
which includes free angels who fall is better overall than a world that does
not. Because these superhuman beings possess enormous power, they can
inflict upon God's vulnerable human children miseries of deprivation, disease, and injury that exceed even the human moral evils Ivan recounts.
Clearly, the good of angelic moral life is purchased at an enormous price in
human misery.

3. Natural Suffering Without Satan
We might hope to ease the problem of victimization by giving an account
of natural evils that leaves Satan and friends out of the account. Consider,
for example, the following suggestion:
(d') W contains no gratuitous evils, i.e., no evils that God can eliminate
without thereby producing an equal or greater evil or eliminating a
greater good.

Gratuitous evils can be properly eliminated by God. s Elimination of a nongratuitous evil, however, would either be pointless (if it results in the substitution of equivalently great evil) or counter-productive. The gratuitousness
of evils is determined relative to the good God seeks for creatures. Given
Plantinga's appeal (in R) to the good of moral freedom and moral life, (d')
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specifies that God will eliminate i) evils the absence of which will improve
the balance of moral good and moral evil in W, and ii) evils that are not linked
to the generation of moral goods and moral evils. 9
Note three further features of this condition. First, it does not rule out the
possibility that W might contain any number of evils the elimination of which
would result in a better balance of moral good and moral evil in W. It denies
only that these evils could advantageously be eliminated by God rather than
by creatures (e.g., through creatures' free choices that blunt the effects of
certain natural or moral evils). Second, this exclusion of gratuitous evils does
not rule out all "dysteleological evils," i.e., evils that are neither necessary
for nor the best means to God's ends. Many moral evils may be dysteleological in this sense, but not gratuitous. For the good God intends could be
achieved without the occurrence of these moral evils, but not without permitting the choices that generate them. Third, to deny that an evil is gratuitous
is not to say that God has a reason for permitting this specific evil to occur.
It may be, for example, that some member(s) of a class of evils must be
permitted, but that there is no reason why this member of the class is permitted; e.g., there may simply be no reason why God permits this or that particular natural evil.
This formulation of the fourth conditions suggests that we think of natural
suffering (or the liability to such suffering) as a logically necessary condition
for moral life. 10 There are at least two ways in which this claim is commonly
defended, and both raise the problem of victimization. First, we might contend that one of the logically necessary conditions for the exercise by creatures of a capacity to act intentionally and to learn from experience is that
they be located in a relatively stable and consistent environment. But if there
are uniformly operating laws of nature, then we are bound to find that those
laws and our interests sometimes collide: the winter wind cannot be a both
our backs when we walk in opposite directions. Second, we might argue that
natural misfortune and suffering are among the necessary conditions for
human responses of mutual support, compassion, courage, fortitude, and so
on. If each person were always to receive from nature exactly what she
needed, there would be no occasion to concern ourselves with one another's
well-being and to act out of compassion or generosity or self-sacrificial
regard for the other's need. Only if persons are sometimes wounded by the
world can we develop a rich range of moral dispositions and practices.
The problem of victimization arises for these arguments insofar as some
individuals suffer disproportionately while sharing very little in the goods
made possible by the natural world, e.g., as when a child is born to a short
and painful life with severe physical and mental impairments. The first argument contends that the possibility of such evils is necessarily built into a
natural order that makes possible the benefits of moral freedom for the rest
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of humanity. Natural evil, here, is not a means by which God seeks the good
for human beings but rather is an inevitable result of establishing the structures necessary to achieve that good. However, in contrast to positions that
explain natural evil as arising from moral evil, it is not possible on this account
to say simply that God permits these evils. Rather, God will be the (or a) cause
of natural evil, for God establishes the natural order in which human lives are
lived, and within that order it is inevitable that we suffer and die. It is also
true, of course, that our free actions (wittingly and unwittingly) affect the
frequency, duration, and intensity of our suffering. But this cannot be a factor
in considering the child who dies after a short and miserable life; here the
sufferer neither contributes to bringing about his own suffering nor shares
significantly in the higher good for the sake of which that suffering is permitted.
According to the second argument, natural evils do serve as a means to the
development of certain aspects of moral life, e.g., courage in the sufferer and
compassionate action in the witness. Human suffering, of course, is morally
destructive as well as creative, and there seems to be no guarantee that any
particular instance of natural evil will generate counter-balancing moral
goods either for the sufferer or for others. This is at least in part because the
emergence of these traits of moral character depends upon persons' free
responses to their own and others' suffering. The problem of victimization
arises, however, when it is impossible or unreasonable to expect that an
individual's suffering could contribute to a proportionate good for that individual; in such a case, the individual's anguish serves at most as a means to
the moral growth of others.
It is worth noting an additional feature of the second argument, viz., it
appears to entail that natural evils cannot be distributed according to any
morally meaningful principle that we can formulate. Suppose, for example,
that natural evils were distributed according to a principle of retributive
justice and that we knew how this principle worked, e.g., we knew that
cheating on your income tax was followed by some physical affliction that
would abate as soon as you recognized the error of your ways and made
amends (with interest and penalties). In such a world, each person would
receive exactly the suffering he deserves, he would have the power to bring
that suffering to an end, and he would suffer for his own good (insofar as his
miseries direct him bach to right behavior). It certainly appears that at least
some traits of moral character either could not emerge or would be differently
valued in this disciplinarian universe. This would be true of most of the
dispositions associated with acting to relieve the suffering of others. I I In fact,
to act in this way could have a bad effect on the sufferer's character and on
your own, for you would be siding with him in his moral intransigence (and
you might weB incur some penalty yourself). Efforts to ease his pain would,
in any case, be bound to fail; the sufferer would be the only one who could
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address the source of his suffering. Further, it appears that Kantian moral
goodness (willing the good for its own sake) would be very difficult to
achieve in a world that so conscientiously provides external inducements. But
we need not pursue this thought experiment further in order to see where it
leads, viz., to the conclusion that there must be undeserved suffering if certain
moral goods are to be realized. This point is helpful in responding to an
important objection to God's goodness in the governance of our world-but
it clearly reinforces the problem of victimization.
In sum, whichever of the strategies (d) or (d') we take up in responding to
natural suffering, the problem of victimization arises, just as it does in defending God's permission of human moral freedom. Indeed, Ivan's challenge
is bound to arise as long as we formulate the moral justification for God's
permission or production of evils exclusively in terms of the overall level
and balance of intrinsic goods and evils realized in the world as a whole. For
this overlooks the putative moral wrong done to individuals whose lives are
diminished and destroyed in the process of generating this general good. Ivan
insists that a world which contains evils of the kind he recounts cannot be
one that a morally perfect being would create, and this will be true even
if the world satisfies all the conditions in R. As we noted, Plantinga need
not claim that R is morally sufficient as it stands. But in its present form,
R explicitly includes only consequentialist considerations. Anyone who is
troubled by deontological objections to consequentialism has reason to take
Ivan's objection seriously and to conclude that this formulation of the free
will defense falls short of establishing the consistency of evil and God'
goodness, however clever it may be in handling God's omniscience and
omnipotence.

4. Suffering For Your Own Good
In responding to Ivan, two general strategies are available. We can grant
the moral aptness of his objection and try to formulate a defense that meets
it. Or we can challenge the moral soundness of his objection. I want to begin
by briefly considering a recent proposal that pursues the first strategy.
In an intriguing essay on the problem of evil, Eleonore Stump contends
that it is morally permissible for God to allow a person to suffer involuntarily
only if that suffering is for the person's own good.
I am trying to avoid constructing the sort of explanation for evil which
requires telling the sufferer that God lets him suffer just for the sake of some
abstract general good for mankind .... It seems to me ... that a perfectly
good entity who was also omniscient and omnipotent must govern the evil
resulting from the misuse of [creaturely] freedom in such a way that the
sufferings of any particular person are outweighed by the good which the
suffering produces for that person. 12
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In order to explain how this condition could be met, Stump suggests that the
suffering that results from natural and moral evils has a pedagogical purpose;
it is permitted or brought about by God in order "to make men recognize their
own evils, become dissatisfied with things of this world, and turn to God."\3
This is necessary because human beings have fallen into sin and now suffer
from a defect in free will which inclines us toward evil. On Stump's account,
then, God permits or causes each particular instance of suffering from natural
and moral evils because that is the best means under the circumstances to
induce this individual to turn to God for help in repairing her will.
This position generates the result that every individual receives just the
suffering she needs. This should be distinguished from saying that each individual deserves to suffer as she does; Stump does not hold that all suffering
is retributive, though some may be. But it is true on her view that God
practices the pedagogy of pain on a grand scale. God so arranges the world
that each act of moral evil or each instance of natural misfortune brings
suffering to those persons who can best be helped toward repentance in just
this way.14 A person may not in fact learn anything from some instance of
suffering, but this hardship or loss was given to this person because it offered
the best prospect of teaching her what she most needs to know, viz., that the
very ground of all her choices is distorted and that she cannot remedy this
situation on her own. On this account, therefore, no one becomes a victim of
evil in the sense that troubled Ivan, i.e., no one undergoes suffering that she
would have been better off without.
Stump is well aware that her position invites a flurry of criticism, and she
puts it forward "with considerable diffidence."ls Objections are bound to be
triggered, first, by the stunning counter-intuitiveness of suggesting that the
interests of, e.g., the children in Ivan's story are best served by being beaten
to death or torn apart by the dogs, and second, by theological puzzlement
over the claim that a God of perfect goodness, power, and knowledge should
rely so heavily on so harsh a pedagogy of pain. Perhaps these initial intuitions
can be disarmed and other similar objections be answered. But for the purposes of my argument the important point concerns the moral principle that
lies at the root of her position. Stump arrives at this view, in part, because
she takes so seriously the kind of objection Ivan raises to standard approaches
to the problem of evil. Ivan insists (though not in quite these words) that we
must not turn God into a utilitarian. Stump agrees, and sets out to devise a
theodicy in which no one's suffering is explained exclusively in terms of the
general conditions (e.g., human freedom, the natural order) that make certain
goods available in the world. But this means that each instance of suffering
must be explained and justified by reference to its role in fostering that
individual's own good. And so we arrive at the conclusion that each person
suffers to further the cause of her own salvation.
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None of this need be said if Ivan's objection can be rebutted rather than
adopted. It is to that task that I now turn.

5. Answering Ivan
The second strategy of response, which challenges the moral underpinnings
of Ivan's objection, can itself take at least two forms. First, over against Ivan's
typically deontological critique, we might offer a consequentialist reply
which would claim that the free will defense as expressed by R is morally
sufficient as it stands. The fundamental effort here must be to undercut deontological objections to sacrificing the interests of some persons in order to
secure a better overall state of affairs. 16 The theological consequentialist
benefits from the fact that this familiar dispute in normative ethics is modified
in important ways when the agent in question is God. Unlike human beings,
God can carry out the consequentialist program perfectly, infallibly making
all of the necessary judgments about relative goods and evils and about the
total outcomes of every alternative action. Furthermore, the choice that is
under consideration in this case is unique to God alone; it is the choice of
which possible world to actualize. Given the terms of the free will defense,
the alternatives among which God chooses are structured in a highly unusual
way. Conditions (c) and (d) or (d') entail that God can avoid permitting
persons to suffer as victims of evil only by not actualizing free creatures at
all. The good, which must be weighed against the evil of sacrificing the
interests of some individuals, is not just an incremental benefit to certain
other persons. Rather, it includes the good of finite personal existence itself,
the condition for enjoying any good or suffering any evil whatsoever. It may
be difficult to know how to assess the relative moral status of these peculiarly
constituted alternatives. But it is at least not obvious that Ivan's objection
constitutes a sufficient moral reason under theses circumstances not to create
finite free persons at all.
Rather than developing a consequentialist reply of this sort, however, I
want to pursue a second line of response that addresses I van's concerns more
directly. If we remain unconvinced by purely consequentialist moral reasoning, we can grant that the pursuit of the general good must be limited by
principles of regard for individual persons, but then argue that even on deontological grounds it is justifiable for God to permit creatures to suffer some
sacrifice of their individual interests for the sake of the common good. This
approach acknowledges that R is not morally sufficient as it stands, but argues
that it can be made sufficient with appropriate additions.
What would these additions be? One of the characteristic marks of deontological moral theories is their insistence upon what Samuel Scheffler has
called "agent-centered restrictions. "17 Agent-centered restrictions place limits
on how we may treat individuals in promoting the good of all; specifically,
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they stipulate that it is at least sometimes morally impermissible to perform
some action A (e.g., harming an innocent person) even if circumstances arise
in which doing A will secure a greater overall good or avoid a greater overall
evil. For the deontologist, these principles of regard for persons take precedence over concern to maximize the good, impersonally considered. Ivan's
objections, then, can be understood as claiming that there are morally binding
agent-centered restrictions that God violates by permitting persons to suffer
as victims of natural and moral evils. If we are to answer Ivan on his own
terms, we need to ask what these restrictions might be and whether they are
stringent enough to warrant I van's jUdgment against God's moral goodness. 18
If God is to actualize a world containing free creatures, then (given the
conditions Plantinga describes in R) God must permit at least some persons
to suffer as victims of natural and moral evils. Does actualizing these persons
violate any agent-centered restriction? It would be odd (at the very least) to
claim that merely logically possible creatures possess actual rights, e.g., a
right either to be or not to be made actual. But it does make sense to ask what
moral claims a creature makes once it (and its world) has been created by
God, and these claims might include certain counterfactuals, e.g., not to have
been actualized with such awful prospects in so brutal a world. Perhaps, then,
God's choice among possible worlds must be guided by the following agentcentered restriction:
(rl) God must not actualize a world that contains persons whose lives,
through no fault of their own, are on balance an evil (Le., an intrinsic
disvalue) for them rather than a good.

Formulating this restriction poses some problems,19 but for our immediate
purposes this simple statement of it should be sufficient to indicate the principle at work. God will not bring into being persons who are so profoundly
and permanently victimized by others' moral wrongdoing or by nature's hardships that it would have been better for them never to have existed at all.
Given the good of existing as a free moral agent, a considerable level of
undeserved suffering might occur in a life that is nonetheless well worth
living. But if a person's life were so "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"
that she had insufficient opportunity to share in the goods made possible by
moral freedom, then her very existence would be an indictment of God's
goodness-she would have grounds for the moral equivalent of a suit for
wrongful life.
Ivan might immediately insist that precisely this is often the case in the
world in which we live: can the lives of the children he describes plausibly
be counted as a net good for the children themselves? There are two points
to note in this connection. First, the response that I have attributed to Ivan
does not dispute the moral soundness of the principle stated in (rl), rather it
questions whether (rl) is satisfied in the actual world. This moves beyond
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the bounds of a defense and poses a question for theodicy. My concern here,
however, is whether the claim that God is morally good entails that God will
act according to certain principles of regard for persons; I am not arguing
that these moral norms are satisfied in the actual world. 20 Second, in considering the good realized in the life of a free creature, the theistic religious
traditions are concerned not simply with the good of moral life, but also (and
preeminently) with the good of relationship to God. As we have seen,
Plantinga's formulation of the free will defense explicitly mentions only
moral life itself (in the first clause of R). But neither Plantinga's defense nor
my moral argument need (or should) be limited in this way. On the contrary,
theists who affirm the value of human freedom characteristically do so because the capacity for moral life is a prerequisite for a certain kind and quality
of relationship with God. It is for the sake of this good-namely, the perfect
fulfillment of finite persons in loving relation to God-that God creates
persons and their world.
This feature of theism has two important consequences for our consideration of (rl). First, because relationship with God extends beyond death,
victims of evil need not be excluded from sharing in the highest good for the
sake of which moral freedom, and consequently their suffering, has been
permitted. Rather, God can guarantee that each person has the opportunity to
participate in this good, notwithstanding what that person may suffer. Victimization, then, will never constitute the final or decisive word on a person's
life. Second, the good God intends for finite persons vastly exceeds the requirements of (rl). Fulfillment in loving relationship with God is so great a good that
it overwhelmingly outweighs the evils suffered by creatures on the way to this
end. On the theist's view, therefore, the good God seeks in creation is not simply
that the lives of persons be good for them on balance, as (rl) requires, but that
each life be consummated in a particular realization of the qualitatively highest good possible for persons. 21 Even if it could be argued that (rl) does not
set a high enough standard of regard for persons, it could hardly be maintained that this degree of goodness to persons is morally required of God.
Perhaps (rl) alone is not enough, however. We might well think that God
is morally required not only to assure that the life of each free creature can
be, on balance, a good for it, but also to minimize the number and intensity
of evils that free creatures suffer. This "economy of evils" principle is suggested by (d') above. The conditions listed in R, however, had a permissive
rather than a prescriptive force; Plantinga claims only that these conditions
are consistent with God's perfect goodness, but not that they are either necessary or sufficient to vindicate it. Now, however, we want to consider the
principle at work in (d') as a putative moral constraint upon God's pursuit of
the good for creatures. There are at least two forms that this economy of evils
requirement might take. The weaker form stipulates that evils suffered by
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individuals must be minimized relative to the good achieved in the world as
a whole. The stronger form demands that evils suffered by individuals be
minimized relative to the good of that individual.
We can express the weaker version of the economy of evils requirement in
the following form:
(r2) God must not actualize a world in which a person suffers some evil E
if the elimination of E by God would result in a better balance overall
of the goods God intends for persons and the evils God permits.

This version of the economy of evils requirement is not in fact an agent-centered restriction; it requires only that God eliminate gratuitous evils. As a
result, this requirement may itself be subject to limitations of its application
by agent-centered restrictions, e.g., by (rl). But even (rl) and (r2) together
provide no assurance that persons will not suffer as victims of evil involuntarily and without proportionate benefit to themselves. If it is morally objectionable to allow such suffering, then we must invoke the second and stronger
form of the economy of evils requirement. We can express this requirement
in the following way.
(r3) God must not actualize a world in which a person suffers some evil E
if the elimination of E by God would result in a better balance for this
individual of the goods God intends for persons and the evils God
permits.

This specifies that God must limit the moral and natural evils suffered by
each individual to those which will serve the individual's good in the most
efficient way God can (given, once again, the constraints imposed by the
individual's own free choices and the necessary conditions for her moral and
physical life).
Should we regard (r3) as a morally binding agent-centered restriction on
how God seeks the good for creatures? I think not. There are at least two
plausible analyses of the moral requirements that must be satisfied if God's
creative action is to be called morally good, and neither generates the conclusion that God is obligated to satisfy (r3). We can bring these analyses into
view by considering whether any moral requirement would be violated if God
were to actualize a world W' in which (rl) is satisfied, but (r2) and (r3) are
not. There will be creatures in a world W' that suffer more than they would
have suffered in world W, in which (r2) is satisfied. Has God wronged these
crea tures ?22
The first account of the requirements of moral goodness will give a negative
answer to this question. Creatures receive their lives from God as a gift that
God is under no obligation to give; as we noted above, God's actualization
of a world is not a matter of fulfilling a duty to possible persons. Since the
creaturely recipient has no claim upon God to be given this gift at all, he also
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has no moral basis for claiming that this good gift ought to be better, much
less that it ought to be optimally good. Two qualifications are needed here,
however. First, it would be hard to argue with the suggestion that one ought
not to give a gift that the recipient would be better off without. This consideration is captured by (rl), which does constitute an agent-centered restriction
upon God's creative activity. If this condition is met, however, there are no
grounds for any further demand upon God as the giver of this good. Second,
the analogy of gift giving is, of course, imperfect. Ordinarily, the recipient
of a gift has the option to refuse what is offered. In this case, what is given
is the very existence of the recipient, and so there is no one to refuse the gift
until it is given; in calling us and our world into actuality, God makes an
offer we cannot refuse. This does not change the moral logic of the situation,
however. As long as one's life is an intrinsic good overall, it is not clear what
moral ground one could claim for insisting that this good be still greater.
It follows from this, of course, that neither (r2) nor (r3) represents a moral
requirement for God; we can say that God's act of actualizing a world is
morally good even if that act satisfies neither (r2) nor (r3). Theists, however,
typically say a good deal more than that God avoids moral wrongdoing in his
actions toward creatures. God's perfect goodness is expressed in a supererogatory regard for the well-being of creatures. This seems to entail that God
will reduce the evils suffered by creatures to whatever extent he can short of
diminishing the good available to them; God's inexhaustible benevolence will
be expressed in an economy of evils in creation. But which economy of evils
principle expresses the content of God's good-will toward creatures? If, as
the conditions in R provide, (r2) and (r3) cannot both be satisfied, then the
balance of moral considerations requires, I believe, that (r2) take precedence.
In order to see how this is so, consider a world W that contains free
creatures and in which (rl) and (r2) are satisfied, but (r3) is not. Of any
individual whose interests are sacrificed in W it will be true that:
1) he receives his life as a gift that is good overall;
2) he will suffer no gratuitous evils;
3) he will suffer certain evils that he would not have suffered in that world
in which his good is achieved in the most efficient way that God can.

If, on behalf of this victim of evil, we object to this third state of affairs
and insist that this person ought not to be treated this way by God, then
we are demanding that God distribute the good to favor this individual at
the expense of the rest of humankind. But since (r3) is not a moral duty
for God, there is no reason to choose the good of this individual over the
good of all. As the giver of a gift, God specifies that the good received
by each shall be limited by a concern to optimize the distribution of the
good to all. This concern for optimal distribution does not entail any
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general commitment to a consequentialist criterion of moral rightness; the
agent-centered restriction, (rl), remains in force. Rather, in this case (r2)
expresses the logic of generosity.
It might be argued, however, that God's conditional obligations extend
beyond assuring that each individual's life can be a net good for the one who
lives it (i.e., beyond (rl». Perhaps we should say that if God actualizes free
creatures, then God is morally required to minimize the evils they suffer along
the way to the goods he chooses to make available to them. On this second
view, both (r2) and (r3) might be regarded as prima facie duties for God. But,
ex hypothesi, these positive duties cannot both be satisfied. Which takes
precedence? Once again, if we insist on the moral precedence of (r3), then
we are claiming that God is morally bound to distribute the good in a way
that favors the few at the expense of the many whenever God cannot maximize the good of both. But it is not clear what moral rationale could be given
for insisting that a creature, who has no claim to possess this gift at all, can
demand, once he is given the good of life as a child of God, that his good
take precedence over concern to optimize the distribution of the good to all. 23
There is good reason, therefore, to think that (r3) is neither a morally
binding agent-centered restriction nor an entailment of God's perfect goodness to creatures. This conclusion can be reinforced from another direction
if we shift from the moral analysis of God's relation to creatures and consider
instead the moral significance of the creature's relation to God. An individual
who suffers more in world W, which satisfies (r2), than she would in W',
which satisfies (r3), does not voluntarily undertake this sacrifice of her interests. But it may be that the risk of such sacrifice, and even some portion
of one's additional suffering from the evils in W (as compared to W'), represents a morally obligatory burden placed upon the individual for the common good. There are at least two ways this claim might be defended. First,
one might argue that i) persons have certain duties toward one another, e.g.,
an appropriately qualified duty to promote the good of others even at some
cost to oneself, and ii) at least some of the additional suffering we undergo
in W reflects a similar moral demand expressed in the form of a moral
condition upon our existence rather than as a duty which we discharge in
action. Second, one might argue that i) it is at least sometimes morally
justifiable to demand of persons that they sacrifice certain of their interests
for the common good because they have benefitted from communal life, and
ii) similar moral considerations require that free creatures, as the beneficiaries
of God's generosity, sacrifice certain of their interests if this is required for
the optimal distribution of the good God intends for creatures. 24
If these lines of argument were worked out in detail, I expect that they
would include important limits on the individual's moral liability to sacrifice
his interests for the common good. Any such liability will also be limited by
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(rl) and (r2); these two restrictions assure that persons will in fact be beneficiaries, rather than ultimately victims, of God's creative activity. But having
argued that God does not wrong us by permitting us to undergo such sacrifices, it is helpful to make the further point that at least some of this sacrifice
of individual interests might be morally demanded of us.
The result of these considerations is that we can, even from a deontological
moral perspective, make R morally sufficient by amending it in the appropriate ways. The crucial change is the addition of a further condition:
(e) None of the free creatures in Whave lives that, through no fault of their
own, are on balance an evil for them rather than a good.

This, of course, is simply a reformulation of (rl). We do not need to add the
weaker form of the economy of evils requirement, (r2), since it is already
satisfied by conditions (c) and (d) or (d'). The addition of the agent-centered
restriction (e), however, requires a modification in the formulation of (c) so
that this limitation is made explicit.
(c') It is not within God's power to create a world that satisfies condition (e)
and that contains as much moral good and less moral evil than that found
in W.

This change reflects the possibility that a world might satisfy condition (c)
but fail to satisfy (e); given (c'), it may be that that God could actualized a
world with a better balance of moral good over moral evil than that found in
W, but any such world will fail to satisfy condition (e). As I argued above,
we could and should go on to modify the first clause, (1), in R so that it
reflects a theologically richer conception of the good for the sake of which
God permits evil. But even these limited changes are enough to generate
a formulation of R that, on plausible deontological grounds, is morally
sufficient.

6. Victimization and God's Goodness to Persons
If my analysis of the relevant moral issues is correct, then we can both
affirm God's moral goodness and acknowledge that persons sometimes are
victimized by moral and natural evils in the world that God has made. Ivan's
moral objection need not drive us to adopt the problematic principle that all
suffering is in the sufferer's best interest. Persons may suffer more than is
either i) necessary to secure their own good or ii) required as part of the best
(i.e., most direct) means to that good. Such suffering will represent a real loss
for the sufferer, a genuine sacrifice of his interests. Furthermore, when these
evils are the result of other persons' free decisions, there may be no need for
them to occur at all (i.e., God's purposes could be achieved just as well
without them). Here genuine and tragic harm is done to persons; we cannot
say that such events really are always for the sufferer's own good, rather we
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must grieve that they occur at all. We can say, however, that such moral evils
are not gratuitous; it is for the best that God permits them, but not that they
are done.
Ivan contended that God morally wrongs the victims of the world's evils.
In replying to Ivan on his own terms, I have argued that God is not morally
required to do more for us in our victimization than to guarantee us the
opportunity to share in the goods for the sake of which these evils are permitted; victimization must never be the last word on the creature's life. This
clarifies what might be morally required of God, but it gives only a truncated
account of what Christians typically say about God's relation to the world.
Christianity affirms not simply that God fastidiously observes the minimum
conditions of moral rectitude, as though God were to be praised for achieving
a spotless moral record, but rather that God relates to creature with an inexhaustible and self-giving love. We noted earlier that the good God intends
for persons is not simply that their lives be, on balance, a benefit to them.
Beyond this, God intends that they be fulfilled in loving relation to God,
which is a good that vastly overbalances the evils they have suffered. We
now should note as well that this affirmation of God's generosity has direct
bearing upon the problem of our suffering as victims of evil. If, as I have
argued, some of our suffering constitutes a genuine sacrifice of our interests,
then there is no purpose for us in this suffering; it is not given or permitted
by God for our own good. But God may nonetheless draw good for us out of
this evil, giving it a positive and intelligible place in the relational good God
fashions between creature and creator. Although this suffering may not be a
sorrow that we need, and perhaps not even one that the world needs, God
may nonetheless refuse to leave it as a mere loss, an unredeemed diminishment of the overall good realized in our lives. Instead, it may be incorporated
into our relationship with God and made meaningful. Precisely this lies at
the heart of Christianity, which tells the story of an individual who becomes
a victim of the world's moral evils, who neither deserves his suffering nor
suffers for his own good, and yet whose death marks not a defeat of his life
with God but rather the affirmation of God's life with us in and beyond all
victimization. Here God's perfect goodness shows itself as a love that spares
nothing in seeking the good of the creatures God has brought into being.2s
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